Xinjiang De Jin Volume II

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“Nevertheless, proof of the seriousness of the 1969 Sino-Soviet border situation subsequently came with the Soviets’ determined response. All along their side of the common border, defensive fortifications appeared. Immediately, major service areas and re-supply systems materialized from a massive construction effort. Soon thereafter, even the world began to note how the Soviets were overhauling and modernizing all their lines of communication in Asia. In the decade of the 1970s, The USSR and the PRC both initiated vast logistic and operations programs to support their developing strategies during the upcoming confrontations. Many of these programs incorporated improved logistical placements into isolated regions along crucial sections of the border. Positioned where they could move quickly into many pre-planned offensive modes, this support function is as important as the conduct of combat. As Clausewitz warned, “War preparation is (the other) half of the art and science of war. “This 10-15 year buildup and preparation for the possibility of a war that was not to be, was the extent of `saber rattling’, which had moved the two countries to the brink of war by the late 1970s. It was not until the early 1980s and a gradual rapprochement appeared that the two backed away from their precipitous stance and implemented a status quo military stand-down. The world watched as the two powerful nations withdrew from what very likely could have been nuclear war affecting all nations. Civilian and military expatriates have since analyzed, in great depth; the cause, course and consequence of these border confrontations. “This thesis will not dwell on examination or justification of these conflicts, nor will it linger on the political or military outcomes of the skirmishes.” Rather, it will focus on USSR and PRC rationale to, preparation for, and employment of, their unique offensive and defensive strategies in Central Asia. The object therefore is to examine the role which China’s Xinjiang province will play in the ultimate execution of these differing strategies. This thesis will initially focus on background and historical factors that contributed to/led to the border conflicts. After a field research visit to Xinjiang, the author chose that province as the geographical setting, even though it constitutes only a part of the total border area common to the two countries. Tactics and operational strategy leading to USSR/PRC Strategic Doctrines were researched and disclosed an interesting phenomena—a unique match between an exceptional offensive military strategy (the USSR), and an equally exceptional defensive strategy (the PRC). Contrasting military support requirements to service these differing strategies led to the next part of the thesis: an examination of the logistical buildup each side used during the ensuing confrontations. Finally, in a comparative analysis of the prominent principles of these strategies, an extrapolation concludes the eventual fate and the role of Xinjiang itself.

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