Meaning and Saying: Essays in the Philosophy of Language

About the Book

Meaning and Saying has five chapters that address philosophical problems about language and knowledge, and one essay (chapter 6: "Postscript") that provides insights into some of Frank Ebersole’s basic ideas about philosophy. The five essays let you participate in his unique struggles to come to terms with such questions as:

• Is the meaning of a word central to the philosophy of language?

• Is the meaning of a word the part the word plays in speech acts?

• How does the action of making sounds fit into speech?

• Are conditions for knowing something the same as conditions required for saying one knows something?

• Should philosophers still be doing conceptual analysis?

• Can G. E. Moore really refute the philosophical skeptic by displaying his hand and saying "I know this is my hand"?

This and its companion volume, Language and Perception, are not just other philosophy books about the philosophy of language. In both books Ebersole, by carefully using examples, convincingly shows that the problems are products of philosophical pictures. The examples also make the pictures less compelling.

This edition differs from the first edition (University Press of America, 1979) in several ways.

• Two more essays are included:

• "Saying and Meaning" (chapter 4) is a revised version of an essay originally published in Ludwig Wittgenstein: Philosophy and Language, eds. Alice Ambrose and Morris Lazerowitz (George Allen and Unwin, London and Humanities Press, New York, 1972), pp. 186–221.

• "Saying What You Know" (chapter 5) was first read as a paper in Coos Bay, Oregon on May 26, 1996 at the conference, "Where the Action Is." A modified version of the paper was then published in Philosophical Investigations, vol. 23, no. 3, July 2000. Now it has been expanded and revised.

• Material that was formerly part of the preface is now revised and placed as chapter 6 at the end, entitled “Postscript.”

• The text is improved. Throughout the book, Ebersole has made corrections, stylistic improvements, and changed wording to remove ambiguities.

Language and logic provide philosophers with a dual problem: (1) How is language connected to the world and (2) how can philosophers use language and logic with care so as not to contaminate their own thinking? Speech acts and the use of sentences are thought to be better ways for philosophers to understand language and logic. But do they do the job?

In the early 1920’s philosophers argued that philosophy should be philosophy of language; but this was just old wine in new bottles; then the Wittgensteinian revolution occurred, which identified meaning as the use of words and thereafter identified the meaning of a word with the “use” of a word. The book addresses some problems with this revolution.

About the Author

Frank B. Ebersole has a philosophy Ph.D. (1947) from the University of Chicago. Initially he was interested in biologically oriented metaphysics, later with analytic and ordinary language philosophy—eventually he evolved into a philosopher whose ideas and methods are unique. Ebersole has held various teaching posts but spent most of his career at the University of Oregon. He has given papers at philosophy meetings and has published widely in philosophy journals. However, much of his writing is not intended for journal publication and is available only in his books: Things We Know, Meaning and Saying, and Language and Perception.