Radar Men: A. P. Rowe and John Strath in War and Peace
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Rowe's concepts for operational research and the partnering of scientist/serviceman were still evolving in 1936. However, it was clear that he had already moved a great distance from the role of committee minute-taker to becoming an essential player in the development of Britain's radar-based defences. When the Tizard Committee needed to meet with senior RAF officers, Wimperis, Tizard and Rowe represented the committee and, by extension, the radar development project. Watson Watt, although Superintendent of the Bawdsey Research Station, was kept out of policy matters and was rarely exposed in high-level government and RAF forums where his unpredictability could be a liability. Rowe spoke for him and became close to Air Marshal Dowding, appointed as Commander-in-Chief of the newly established Fighter Command in July 1936 and promoted to Air Chief Marshal in January 1937. Rowe was increasingly seen as the invaluable voice of reason, complementing the mercurial Watson Watt, from whom a stream of ideas continued to flow and to whom the radar development team looked as their charismatic leader. Rowe was the reliable finisher --he ensured that the Tizard Committee's non-executive decision making was actioned through the Swinton Committee, the Air Ministry and the RAF. Nothing fell through the cracks as he addressed civil works for the new sites, training for operation and maintenance, and industry liaison. Rowe was emerging as the middle manager. When, in August 1936, a scientist was required to work with the RAF during the Biggin Hill experiment, it was Rowe who made the selection. Much was learned from the Biggin Hill experiment, sufficient to encourage senior RAF officers and politicians who witnessed the trials that the expected air battle could be won. However, the trials had used simulated radar feeds: during 1936, development of the actual radar chain to provide the feeds was not experiencing the same success story. Recurrent delays occurred at Bawdsey. The consequential rush to complete arrangements by 17 September 1936, the date set by the ever-optimistic Watson Watt for a demonstration to VIPs, including Dowding, led to the event being a complete fiasco with no detections of the RAF trials aircraft. The demonstration was intended to show that radar's development stage was close to completion and that replication of the Bawdsey design to the five CH sites being prepared could go ahead. It showed precisely the opposite. Tizard was furious, with Watson Watt defensive. Although Watson Watt could not be blamed for all of the shortfalls in planning and execution - delays in the Air Ministry's staffing of such a high-priority project are incomprehensible - his shortcomings as a manager were becoming ever clearer. Yet Watson Watt was well regarded by his staff and evoked their fierce loyalty. Most were young single men who revelled in the freedom and camaraderie, more akin to that found on a university campus than in a Civil Service establishment, with this encouraged by their Superintendent. After the radar team's annus horribilis of 1936, Watson Watt appears to have made a real effort to ensure his team remained focused on demonstrable outcomes and as a result solid progress was made during 1937. The CH team made major technical and reliability improvements to the radar; Bowen's team achieved significant success in developing an airborne radar that could be used for the detection of ships as well as aircraft; a CH operator training school was established; and Watson Watt presided over some carefully crafted demonstrations to VIPs, aimed at erasing the negative perceptions of the failed demonstration held the previous September. Rowe was frequently on-site and, after an April 1937 trial, although noting shortfalls in operator training, he reported favourably `[t]here is presumably no doubt that the performance of Bawdsey on this occasion would have aided interception to an extent which three years ago would have seemed almost impossible'. On the basis of such favourable assessments, by June 1937 the Air Ministry was prepared to proceed with building not only the five stations to which it was already committed but an additional 15 stations. The cost was relatively enormous but, by 1937, there was a gloomy inevitability that soon Britain would be at war and for the decision makers it was no time for parsimony.
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About the Book
World War II defined its heroes and villains. There are many books on national leaders like Churchill and Hitler, generals like Montgomery and Rommel. Less has been written about the civilian scientists, engineers, and technicians whose work produced military innovations that drove the direction and outcome of that terrible conflict. This book is a connected and interlaced narrative of two men who were World War II civilian scientists. It is a non-technical portrait of two twentieth-century life stories against a backdrop of war and peace, which are important in both historical context and as illustrations of the human condition lived in extraordinary circumstances. The lives of A. P. Rowe and John Strath intersected in the British development of radar in the 1930s and 1940s and then diverged into critical roles in Britain and Australia after the war. Rowe and Strath worked in Britain’s epic development of radar defences, without which the 1940 aerial Battle of Britain would have been lost. Rowe led what has been termed as ‘one of the most successful research establishments of all time,’ focussed on the development and deployment of radar; Strath was a junior member of that establishment. After the war, both men moved to Australia where Rowe, after a short and unhappy involvement as lead scientific adviser on the development of Australia's Woomera rocket range and Australian defence, was for a decade a highly contentious vice chancellor of the University of Adelaide. Strath became involved in development of the British atomic weapon and monitoring of nuclear test effects in Australia and then became the prime mover for development of what is now Australia’s Jindalee Operational Radar Network, a major component of the country’s long-range defence surveillance.
About the Author
Donald (Don) Sinnott has published many professional papers, articles, and book chapters in an extended career as a scientist and engineer. He now turns his hand to writing interlaced biographies of two scientists, one known to him personally, who played significant yet underappreciated roles in World War II and the uneasy peace that followed. As a researcher in radio and radar technologies, Don worked for many years in the science and technology agency, supporting and advising Australia’s Department of Defence. He played a major role in Australia’s development of over-the-horizon radar, embodied in Australia’s world-leading project Jindalee, before moving to senior defence management positions. In 2000 he became CEO of a university-based centre driving collaborative research across academic, business, and government sectors and subsequently became an independent consultant, serving these sectors. He has been and remains as an adjunct professor with the University of Adelaide, Australia, where he has taught and supervised higher-degree students. Don holds degrees in electronic engineering (including a PhD from Syracuse University, New York, USA), is a fellow of both the Australian Institution of Engineers and of the US-based Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers. In 2014 he was awarded the Engineers Australia M. A. Sargent Medal, for which the citation refers to his ‘eminence and leadership’ in his field. Don’s previously published work aimed at a general readership includes collaborating in a biography of a Sudanese refugee and contributions to local history.