To Provide and Maintain a Navy: 1775-1945

THIS WELL-WRITTEN, well-researched, and well-illustrated book draws insight from history and lessons learned (but frequently forgotten) which are applicable today. While no analogies are perfect, historical precedents are powerful learning tools, and I highly recommend this book.

The book’s title refers to Article I of the Constitution which states “The Congress shall have the power to provide and maintain a Navy.” There was little dispute over this “enumerated power” since all the framers were aware of how much the economic prosperity of the country depended on sea-going trade. The framers, however, held very different views about what form the new Navy should take. George Washington, John Adams, and Alexander Hamilton argued for a strong ocean-going Navy, as well as a strong Federal government. Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, James Monroe, and other anti-Federalists felt that a coastal defense force was sufficient. Debate about the roles and missions of the Navy continue to this day.

From the Revolutionary War to World War II the Navy would range from robust to second or third tier and back again. The book summarizes the lessons learned in terms of five factors: public consensus (important since elected representatives listen to their constituents), presidential support (essential in times of peace), preparations when consensus is lacking (invest in new technologies and evaluate in realistic war games), deciding what ships to build and when (general vice special purpose ships), and industrial base realities (warship-unique equipment and material suppliers as well as private and public shipyards). Examples of these five factors:

The British surrender at Yorktown was largely due to our French ally’s ability to exercise local sea control long enough to prevent any British army reinforcements being landed or troops being evacuated. A lesson not lost on General Washington, who when president, would establish a standing Navy with construction of the six frigates designed by Joshua Humphreys.

Preparing during peace time, largely in the absence of a consensus to rearm, occurred in the years following World War One. War Plan Orange, a joint Army-Navy plan, envisioned a future war with Japan where the U.S. would be without allies. Both the U.S. and Japan believed that a Mahan-like decisive battle, fought in Japanese waters, between battleships would determine the outcome. It was taken for granted that the role of both aircraft carriers and submarines while important, would be largely secondary. Regardless, the Naval War College used tabletop war games to develop proposed carrier tactics, and the fleet evaluated these tactics during its annual fleet exercise. These fleet exercises included simulated attacks on the Panama Canal and on Pearl Harbor by carrier-borne aircraft, which demonstrated the growing importance of naval aviation. It became clear that in the event of a war with Japan, the Navy would need more carriers.

Throughout history naval planners have wrestled with what ships to build and when, including deciding the appropriate mix between general purpose and special purpose ships. Washington’s frigates were general purpose ships whereas Jefferson’s gun boats were special purpose. Riverine craft used in both the Civil War and a century later in the Vietnam War were also special purpose. The need for special purpose ship types, however, hadn’t been anticipated in War Plan Orange.

Once the U.S. began supporting Great Britain, the need for special purpose ships soon became apparent, including destroyer escorts (DEs) to serve as ASW escorts for merchant convoys. Additionally, when the U.S. entered World War II it had no amphibious warfare ships. This would soon change, and in both the European and Pacific theaters large numbers of amphibious warfare ships and craft of various sizes and types would eventually be required.

To Provide and Maintain a Navy: 1775-1945 is a fascinating book and should be of interest to a wide audience. It is common to think that the rate of change of technology today is far greater than in the past, and that we face challenges which are unprecedented, i.e. that history has little to teach us. Today’s Navy is the result of the steps and missteps taken in the past. This book is an invaluable learning experience.

- Naval Engineers Journal