A World in Transition: America, Europe and the Transformation of the Global Order

The liberal international system is in transition as the global order is increasingly contested by major powers. This situation is exacerbated by shifts in U.S. global leadership which was the foundation of the international order. In this context Trump's security and foreign policy seeks to transform both global security arrangements and the international political economy. This is characterised by U.S. institutional disengagement, strategic realignment, and recalibrated global relationships, creating a profound impact of the administration's policies on global governance and security dynamics. This book has argued that the global order is not simply collapsing or fragmenting, as some accounts have suggested, but undergoing a more complex process of contested continuity. While American leadership has eroded in relative terms, it has not disappeared. European strategic autonomy remains an aspiration, and the extent to which it can become reality remains to be seen. Major institutions of the liberal international order — NATO, the EU, the WTO — have absorbed shocks, adapted, and in some cases, even strengthened. The defining feature of today’s transformation is neither an abrupt end of the post-Cold War era nor the emergence of a distinct multipolar alternative. Instead, the world is transitioning toward a hybrid structure: one where American and European influence persists but is increasingly challenged, negotiated, and reshaped by new and existing powers alike. This transition is uneven, crisis-driven, and open-ended, but it is far from the anarchic breakdown that some pessimistic forecasts predict. European defence spending increased, but much of it relied on American military platforms and logistical support. EU initiatives on defence cooperation advanced but remained secondary to NATO’s primacy. This could change if the security interests of the United States and Europe diverge more fundamentally in the future. The European Union proved more geopolitically resilient than many predicted — especially through unified sanctions against Russia and financial coordination — but European strategic autonomy remains limited. Security dependence on the United States persists, particularly in the military sphere, while political cohesion remains vulnerable to internal fragmentation.The concept of contested continuity captures the core dynamic of this transitional era. Rather than framing the current moment as a binary — either “liberal order persists” or “new order emerges” — this analysis suggests a more complex, layered reality. Continuity persists in institutional structures, alliance frameworks, and many core norms (especially in finance, security cooperation, and trade among allies). Contestations multiply regarding who belongs, who leads, and what principles should govern the order. Rising powers like China and India do not seek to destroy the system outright but to reshape it to their advantage.Meanwhile, Western actors themselves are often divided over the scope and nature of the liberal international project. This dual process — persistence and contestation — defines the transition underway. The future will not be a simple restoration of the 1990s unipolar moment, nor a clean replacement by a new multipolar balance. It could be an evolving, negotiated order — with legacies of the past coexisting with pressures for change. In terms of a positive pathway, the United States and Europe successfully adapt existing institutions to new power realities. Reforms to bodies like the WTO, IMF, and UN Security Council — while difficult — allow rising powers greater voice without undermining the core rules-based framework. Alliances would endure but are modernized; regional organizations strengthen; middle powers are more meaningfully integrated into global decision-making. Conflict is managed through diplomacy, economic interdependence persists (albeit selectively decoupled in strategic sectors), and global cooperation on transnational issues — climate, pandemics, technology — continues, even amid rivalry. This is the pathway of renewed but constrained liberal internationalism. However, we cannot exclude the possibility of a more competitive fragmentation, especially if the nationalist/semi-isolationist perspective in the United States endures beyond Trump. In this scenario, the world moves toward hardened blocs and spheres of influence. Selective decoupling intensifies; institutions become arenas of contestation rather than cooperation. Security dilemmas proliferate, particularly in regions like the Indo-Pacific, Eastern Europe, and parts of Africa. The United States and Europe remain close but increasingly prioritize national or bloc interests over multilateral problem-solving. China, Russia, and other powers carve out parallel institutions and norms. Crisis management becomes harder, global governance weaker, and the risk of escalation rises.